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Andrew K. Woods*
The Limits of Moral Intuitions for Human
Rights Advocacy
Abstract: The central ambition of human rights advocacy is to get people to
care, who might otherwise not, about the suffering of others. To accomplish
this, human rights advocates often appeal to moral intuitions by telling stories
that evoke moral outrage, indignation, or guilt. Are these sorts of appeals a
good way to promote human rights? The conventional wisdom suggests that
they are. But perhaps the conventional wisdom is incomplete – perhaps
human rights advocates should treat moral intuitions with skepticism rather
than uncritical embrace. In this brief essay, I argue that appeals to moral
intuitions are problematic because moral intuitions can lead people to make
decisions that are suboptimal from the standpoint of the human rights
regime’s goals. I attempt to show, in other words, that one of the great assets
of the human rights regime – its ability to harness our strong intuitive reaction
to the suffering of others – is also one of its great limitations. To make this
argument, I draw from the mind sciences literature on moral decision-making.
The latest research in this domain suggests that our moral intuitions are
fallible. A number of studies have shown, for example, that moral outrage
and indignation can cause people to make decisions that they would not
defend under cooler conditions. I focus on three particular sorts of moral
judgment biases and explore their implications for human rights advocacy. I
then evaluate two different normative claims one might make about these
moral judgment biases and offer several concluding thoughts.
DOI 10.1515/lehr-2015-0002
Introduction
The central ambition of human rights advocacy is to get people to care, who
might otherwise not, about the suffering of others. To accomplish this, human
rights advocates make appeals to moral intuitions; that is, they try to get
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audiences to feel something about the suffering of others. This is a longstanding
practice: historians have noted that the earliest human rights campaigns told
stories of individual suffering – often borrowing techniques from nascent art
forms like the novel – to encourage audiences to empathize with faraway
victims.1 Today, human rights advocates use new technologies and social
media to amplify their message, but they still rely on the same essential meth-
ods: stories of wrongdoing that provoke strong feelings of sympathy, guilt, and
outrage.2
The most prominent recent example of this can be seen in the Kony 2012
campaign, a viral video project aimed at highlighting the crimes of African rebel
Joseph Kony, who was indicted by the International Criminal Court, but remains
at large.3 The video tells the story of an American man who travels to Africa,
where he meets a young boy fleeing Joseph Kony’s forces. The story is intuitively
compelling – viewers feel sympathy for Kony’s victims and moral outrage over
Kony’s crimes. The video has enjoyed enormous success: It has been viewed
over 100 million times, making it one of the most viral videos of all time, and
likely the farthest reaching human rights campaign to date.4
Is this a good way to advocate human rights? Conventional wisdom suggests
that these sorts of appeals to moral intuitions are useful tools for political
mobilization, tools that may be crucial to the success of the human rights
regime. As Rorty notes, reason and deliberation will not persuade people to
care about distant human rights abuses; human rights advocates must deploy
“sentimental education”:
[T]he sort of sad, sentimental story which begins “Because this is what it is like to be in her
situation – to be far from home, among strangers”, or “Because she might become your
daughter-in-law”, or “Because her mother would grieve for her”. Such stories, repeated
and varied over the centuries, have induced us, the rich, safe, powerful, people, to tolerate,
and even to cherish, powerless people – people whose appearance or habits or beliefs at
1 See LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS 31–37 (2007) (tracing a brief history of the idea of
universal human rights and noting that the concept built on audience experiences of empathy
in art forms like the novel).
2 See generally STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING (2001)
(describing the tactics that human rights advocates use to arouse sympathy for victims of faraway
suffering, a particularly difficult task given that audiences are bombarded daily with images of
suffering in the news).
3 See Noam Cohen, A Video Campaign and the Power of Simplicity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/business/media/kony-2012-video-illustrates-the-
power-of-simplicity.html.
4 See Kony 2012, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v = Y4MnpzG5Sqc.
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first seemed an insult to our own moral identity, our sense of the limits of permissible
human variation.5
Put most simply, the conventional wisdom suggests that because moral intui-
tions can be harnessed for political power, human rights advocates should
embrace them.
But perhaps the conventional wisdom is incomplete – perhaps human rights
advocates should treat moral intuitions with critical skepticism rather than
uncritical embrace. While moral intuitions are powerful, they can mislead. In
this essay, I argue that appeals to moral intuitions can be problematic because
moral intuitions have known blind spots, flaws that have implications for
human rights advocacy. I show, in other words, that one of the great assets of
the human rights regime – its ability to harness our strong intuitive reaction to
the suffering of others, including feelings of guilt, empathy, moral outrage, and
indignation – is also one of its great limitations.
To make this argument, I draw from the mind sciences literature on moral
decision-making. The latest research in this domain suggests that our moral
intuitions are not infallible. In fact, a number of mind scientists have shown that
intuitions like moral outrage and indignation can cause people to make sub-
optimal decisions – decisions that they would not defend under cooler condi-
tions. And while intuitive appeals about the plight of other humans can at times
achieve amazing results – for example, prompting enormous transfers of aid in
the wake of earthquakes or Tsunamis – they have been ineffective tools for
preventing genocide and other human rights abuses ex ante.
Before going any further, a number of clarifications are in order. First, this is
not an essay about the use of emotion in human rights discourse; the relation-
ship between emotion and reason is enormously complex and I do not hope to
broach the subject here.6 Rather, the inquiry is concerned with human rights
advocacy that plays on our strong moral intuitions about justice – intuitions, I
hope to show, that lead to suboptimal human rights policy. By “human rights
advocacy” I refer to efforts by individuals and organizations to influence both
the public and policymakers to adopt a particular human rights policy. Reliance
on moral intuitions can lead policymakers to enact suboptimal human rights
policy directly (relying on their own moral intuitions) or indirectly (responding
to their constituents who are relying on their moral intuitions). When I say
“suboptimal,” I mean suboptimal vis-à-vis the goals of the human rights regime;
5 See Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 111
(Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
6 For a meditation on the powerful and often critical role that emotions can play in morality,
see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT (2001).
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I am not concerned here with how intuitions can fail us in absolute moral terms,
but rather how they can fail us as a matter of human rights policy.7
Second, this is a consequentialist analysis. The human rights regime is guided
by a set of international agreements that outline the basic set of universal human
rights. For the purposes of this essay, I assume that the goal of the human rights
regime is to protect as many peoples’ human rights as possible, or to minimize the
scope and number of human rights violations that occur. For example, if prose-
cuting a rebel commander who committed crimes against humanity would desta-
bilize the region and make it likely that new human rights abuses would occur,
my approach may counsel against the prosecution. Someone might read this and
think “but our intuitions to punish bad actors ought to be obeyed because we
have a moral duty to punish human rights violators to the hilt, even if doing so
produces more harms than not punishing them.” I do not address this or other
deontological arguments.8 Instead, I try to evaluate the consequentialist claim
that a human rights regime that conforms to our moral intuitions can and will
produce the most effective human rights policy, all things considered. Specifically,
I show where I think moral intuitions – based on what we know from mind
science research – are likely to produce suboptimal consequences for the human
rights regime on its own terms.
To make my argument, I draw a rough distinction between two sorts of
mental processes: automatic and deliberative. I treat intuitions as largely auto-
matic mental activity – what mind scientists call System 1 processes – and I
contrast these with more deliberative mental activity, such as reasoning through
a math problem, which mind scientists refer to as System 2 processes.9 To some
extent, of course, this is a false distinction. Damasio, among others, has shown
quite persuasively that emotion (typically thought of a System 1 process) and
reason (typically thought of as a System 2 process) are deeply interconnected.10
But the distinction between automatic, gut-level responses and more delibera-
tive responses can still serve as a useful albeit crude distinction between
7 There is of course a vast literature about human intuitions and objective morality, perhaps
most famously developed by Henry Sidgwick. See generally, HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS
(1890).
8 The main reason I do not do this is because – as I have argued elsewhere – many
deontological arguments about human rights are in fact “utility of desert” arguments – con-
sequentialist arguments cloaked in deontological language. See Andrew K. Woods, Moral
Judgments and International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633 (2012).
9 See Keith E. Stanovich & Robert F. West, Individual Difference in Reasoning: Implications for
the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 645 (2000) (introducing the terms “system 1” and
“system 2” to describe the dual process theory of the mind).
10 See ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994).
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different ways of thinking about human rights. Indeed, many of the most
significant findings in experimental psychology and behavioral economics
depend on a rough division between thinking “fast” and thinking “slow.”11
This short essay is structured as follows. First, I introduce the idea of moral
heuristic failure – the idea that our gut-level intuitions are not always useful
guides for complex moral problems like human rights. I then survey three
particular sorts of moral heuristic failure – moral outrage, psychic numbing,
and naïve realism – and examine the implications of moral heuristic failure for
human rights advocacy. This is not a full accounting of the different costs and
benefits associated with an intuition-based human rights advocacy, nor is it a
playbook for how to reform advocacy to be less intuition-dependent. Rather, the
essay merely provides reasons for skepticism about the upward bounds of
relying on our moral intuitions to understand complex atrocities. I conclude
with a brief discussion of potential strategies for establishing safeguards where
we think moral heuristic failure is likely.
The Limits of Moral Intuitions
A growing literature suggests that our automatic moral intuitions rely on heur-
istics – mental shortcuts that produce moral judgments quickly – that can lead
to suboptimal decisions, especially at the level of law and policy.12 Jonathan
Baron demonstrates this with the following example. Imagine that a vaccine
carries some risk of death, but the risk is much lower than that posed by the
disease being vaccinated against. In this scenario, many parents will opt not to
give their child the vaccine out of a fear of actively playing a role in their child’s
death – a fear that is greater than the fear that the child will die of not receiving
the vaccine. These parents are acting irrationally against their own wishes: if the
parent wants to give the child the greatest chance of survival, it ought to
vaccinate. What explains this irrational behavior? The best explanation is that
these parents’ judgment is being driven by an otherwise useful heuristic: “do not
actively do things to your children that might harm them.”13 Unfortunately, in
this scenario the heuristic fails because doing “nothing” (not vaccinating) is
11 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (explaining behavioral econom-
ics and psychology findings that support the dual-mind theory, which broadly conceives of
cognition as either automatic or deliberative, “fast” or “slow”).
12 See Jonathan Baron, Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 1 (1994).
13 Id.
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more dangerous than doing “something that might harm the children”
(vaccinating).
Greene et al. have explicitly shown how heuristic failure maps onto the
dual-process model of the mind – that is, System 1 and System 2 – using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) brain scans. They asked subjects
a series of questions based on the now-famous trolley car dilemma: if a train is
barreling down a track where five people are standing, and the only way to save
them is to switch the train’s path to another track where only one man is
standing, is it morally acceptable to flip the switch to kill the one and save
the five?14 In this trolley dilemma, most people find it morally acceptable to flip
the switch to kill the one to save the five.15 But in a variant on this problem,
known as the footbridge dilemma,16 a fat man stands on a footbridge over the
train’s track and only by pushing him onto the track, killing him, can the train
be stopped and the five saved. Here, experiment subjects and professional
philosophers tend to agree that it is not acceptable to kill the one to save the
five.17
Why might people exhibit a consequentialist reading of the trolley problem –
kill one to save five – but a deontological reading of the footbridge case? Greene
and colleagues suggest that the best explanation is that people tend toward
consequentialism when using System 2, their deliberative mental process, but
not when they switch to automatic, heuristic-based System 1 thinking. That is,
when subjects do not have strong intuitions about a particular case and must
reason through their answer, as they do with the trolley example, they give
utilitarian answers, finding it acceptable to kill one to save five. But when subjects
are given scenarios that trigger strong intuitive feelings – such as the repulsion
many people have to pushing someone to their death in the footbridge case – they
gave non-utilitarian responses, finding it unacceptable to kill one to save five.18
14 See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5
(1967) (describing the trolley thought experiment).
15 See Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, 3 MORAL PSYCHOL. 35, 42 (2007) (noting
that “The consensus among philosophers, as well as people who have been tested experimen-
tally, is that it is morally acceptable to save five lives at the expense of one in this case”)
(citations omitted).
16 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 (2) THE MONIST 204
(1976).
17 See Greene, supra note 15, at 42 (“Here the consensus is that it is not okay to save five lives at
the expense of one”) (citations omitted).
18 Id. at 108 (“intuitive responses [to the moral judgment in the footbridge case] drive people to
give nonutilitarian response to moral dilemmas that have previously been categorized as ‘perso-
nal.’… these intuitive responses are emotional (i.e., constituted or driven by emotions)”).
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This difference was detected by brain scans. When they gave the trolley and
footbridge problems to people under fMRI scanners, Greene et al. found that
different regions of the mind were activated: in the footbridge case, neural
activity was seen in the region of the mind usually associated with emotions
and social cognition (amygdale and medial surfaces of frontal and parietal
lobes) while the trolley cases sparked neural activity in the area of the brain
used for math and computation (the dorsolateral surfaces of the prefrontal
cortex and parietal lobes).19 This finding was especially robust. Different experi-
ments showed that in some fact patterns, when subjects reach consequentialist
outcomes over their deontological alternative, the fMRI recorded cognitive activ-
ity in the brain regions associated with such careful deliberation. Greene finds
further support for this in the crying baby case. In that hypothetical, subjects are
told that a group of people are hiding in the basement from soldiers who are
currently searching their house. They know that the soldiers will kill them if they
are discovered. When an infant starts to cry, its mother is faced with a terrible
choice: smother the infant and save the group, or let the baby cry, condemning
the group to certain death. Is it morally acceptable for the mother to smother her
infant? Greene explains:
Cases like crying baby are especially interesting because they allow us to directly compare
the neural activity associated with characteristically consequentialist and deontological
responses. According to our model, when people say “yes” to such cases (the consequen-
tialist answer), it is because the “cognitive” cost-benefit analysis has successfully domi-
nated the prepotent emotional response that drives people to say “no” (the deontological
answer). If that is correct, then we should expect to see increased activity in the previously
identified “cognitive” brain regions (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal
cortex) for the trials in which people say “yes” in response to cases like crying baby. This is
exactly what we found. In other words, people exhibit more “cognitive” activity when they
give the consequentialist answer.20
When subjects were prompted with questions that did not trigger System 1, they
reached the consequentialist outcome; when the questions triggered strong
moral intuitions, a different portion of the brain lit up and the subjects were
much more likely to produce a nonconsequentialist outcome.21
19 See Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389, 389–400 (2004) (reviewing earlier literature and testing a hypothesis
and finding support for the claim that moral judgments can occur through two separate
processes, one deliberative and one more automatic).
20 See Greene, supra note 15, at 45–46.
21 Different portions of the brain register activity that roughly maps onto what Greene calls
“cognitive” and “emotional” thought. See id. at 40.
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This suggests that while our intuitions allow us to make decisions quickly,
without deliberation, they can also produce suboptimal decisions. These judg-
ment biases have been explored in a wide range of issues, from vaccines to
climate change.22 But they have been largely underappreciated in the human
rights context, where they can have grave consequences. The risk of heuristic
failure may be particularly pronounced at the international level, where the
subject matter – genocide, mass atrocity – may be difficult to comprehend, let
alone resolve by intuition alone. The following section outlines three sorts of
heuristic failures that are especially worrisome for the human rights regime.
Three Ways Our Intuitions Betray Us
If our moral intuitions can mislead us, this may be especially problematic for the
international human rights regime. Consider three sorts of judgment biases that
affect human rights advocacy: moral outrage, psychic numbing, and naïve
realist thinking.
Moral Outrage
When human rights campaigns stoke moral indignation and outrage, they crowd
out deliberative, consequentialist thinking. Psychologists elegantly demon-
strated this with an experiment about a hypothetical set of damages awards.
Subjects were given a fact pattern detailing the evidence of a tort and asked to
determine damage awards – the experimental group received a fact pattern that
was designed to evoke strong feelings of moral outrage while the treatment
group received a similar but more neutrally worded fact pattern.23 After reading
charged fact patterns that evoked strong intuitions like moral outrage and
indignation, respondents set very high damage awards – both when they were
told the high damages would have no effect on the company’s behavior and,
separately, when they were told the high damages would have harmful effects,
such as forcing the company to stop manufacturing its other socially beneficial
products.24 In this scenario, subjects who were outraged were willing to create a
net social harm in order to satisfy their retributive impulses.
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 (4) BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 42, 531 (2005).
23 See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions about Penalties and Compensation in the Context
of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (1993).
24 Id.
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What explains this desire to punish wrongdoers, regardless of the cost? Both
psychological studies and neuroimaging confirm that the desire to punish – and
satisfaction with its completion – is most closely linked to intuitive, not delib-
erative, thought processes.25 We punish because it feels good, and because not
punishing (allowing a “culture of impunity” to reign) feels bad.26 Experimental
economists have found significant support for this desire to punish in coopera-
tion games – where players are willing to sacrifice their own self-interest in
order to punish the violator of a group norm. (Of course, in these scenarios the
punishment may very well be consequentialist – to reinforce a group norm
against cooperation – but often it is not.27)
This evidence may give us special reason to think that relying on moral
intuitions may lead to suboptimal human rights policies. Consider, for example,
the individuation of guilt in human rights trials. Human rights courts are tasked
with identifying the individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for other-
wise diffuse but terrible group crimes.28 From the standpoint of moral intuitions,
that individuation is not ideal. Studies have shown that, just as people are more
sympathetic and generous toward identifiable victims, they are more punitive
with identifiable wrongdoers, even when the identity of the wrongdoer is irrele-
vant to the wrongness of the act.29 The international criminal regime, in its effort
to individuate justice, is in fact creating special distortion effects – unique
opportunities for moral outrage to crowd out deliberative thinking.
25 See Greene, supra note 15, at 54 (citing neuroimaging study by Alan Sanfey, Jim Rilling, and
colleagues that looked at peoples’ brains while they played the ultimatum game, and observed
that when unfair offers were made, the anterior insula – the part of the brain associated with
anger or disgust – lights up.).
26 Id. at 70; psychologically speaking, we punish primarily because we find punishment
satisfying (de Quervain et al., 2004) and find unpunished transgressions distinctly unsatisfying
(Carlsmith et al., 2002; Kahneman et al., 1998; Sanfey et al., 2003). In other words, the emotions
that drive us to punish are blunt biological instruments. They evolved because they drive us to
punish in ways that lead to (biologically) good consequences. But, as a by-product of their
simple and efficient design, they also lead us to punish in situations in which no (biologically)
good consequences can be expected. Thus, it seems that as an evolutionary matter of fact, we
have a taste for retribution, not because wrongdoers truly deserve to be punished regardless of
the costs and benefits, but because retributive dispositions are an efficient way of inducing
behavior that allows individuals living in social groups to more effectively spread their genes.
27 For an explanation of how this works, see Herbert Gintis et al., Strong Reciprocity and the
Roots of Human Morality, 21 (2) SOC. JUST. RES. 241 (2008).
28 See Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass
Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 581 (2005).
29 See Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, The Devil You Know: The Effects of
Identifiability on Punishment, 18 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 311 (2005).
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This is exacerbated by the nature of the crimes on trial. Crimes against
humanity, “are particularly odious offences in that they constitute a serious
attack on human dignity or grave humiliation or a degradation of one or more
human beings.”30 They constitute some of the gravest offenses known to man.
As Jon Elster argues, the retributive impulse described by Baron and Ritov is all
the stronger in the context of crimes against humanity:
[I]n transitional justice the pure backward-looking argument from desert often has an
overwhelming appeal. It can tap into the very strong retributive emotions that are triggered
by human rights violations on a scale and of an atrocity far beyond what are found under
normal circumstances. It can also tap into the needs of those who did nothing, for whom
retribution can be a means to redeeming themselves in their own eyes and, no doubt, in
those of others.31
Human rights advocates rely on exactly this sort of response in developing their
advocacy materials. The gruesomeness of many human rights abuses therefore
presents a distinct risk of provoking intuitive outrage and retributivism that can
undermine attempts at coolly and deliberately apportioning liability according
to the regime’s goals.
Psychic Numbing
Just as the gravity of human rights abuses can cause our intuitions to lead us
astray, so too can the scale of rights abuses produce judgment errors. For
example, Paul Slovic has identified the phenomenon of “psychic numbing,”
whereby people respond less powerfully to news of a tragedy as the scale and
complexity of the tragedy increases:
One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-
abuse neglect involves the capacity to experience affect, the positive and negative
feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and
actions. Research shows that the statistics of mass rights violations or genocide, no
matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The
numbers fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action. The genocide
in Darfur is real, but we do not “feel” that reality. We examine below ways that we might
make genocide “feel real” and motivate appropriate interventions. Ultimately, however,
we conclude that we cannot only depend on our intuitive feelings about these atrocities.
In addition, we must create and commit ourselves to institutional, legal, and political
30 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 98 (2008).
31 Jon Elster, Retribution, in RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 54 (Jon Elster
ed., 2006).
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responses based upon reasoned analysis of our moral obligations to stop large-scale
human rights violations.32
The smaller the suffering, the greater our intuitive response, and therefore the
greater our financial contribution. An experiment by Small et al. explains this
effect. Subjects on their way out of a psychological experiment were told they
could donate up to $5 of their earnings from the experiment to the NGO Save the
Children. Some respondents were asked to donate in order to feed “Rokia,” a 7-
year-old African girl. Others were asked to donate money to save millions of
Africans from hunger. And still other respondents were asked to donate to
“Rokia,” but were also told of the need to feed millions in Africa. The result
was as follows: the average donation to Rokia was more than twice the donation
to end hunger for millions; and the mere mention of the hunger of millions had
a mitigating effect on the donations to Rokia (Figure 1).33
This perhaps explains why charities like Save the Children focus on support-
ing one child, rather than on ending famine. One way to read the Rokia study is
that respondents feel uneasy intervening in complicated situations of harm. We
can manage the hunger of one girl, subjects might think, but the hunger of a
million people may suggest a wider problem; the mere reference to this struc-
tural problem puts people off from wanting to feed Rokia. One of the biggest and
fastest growing foreign aid charities in the West is the “Smile Train,” which
funds surgeries for babies born with cleft palates. Their advertisements – usually
full-page or half-page graphics in major Western newspapers – feature
Figure 1: Average donations.
32 Ryan Goodman et al., Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY 126 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012).
33 See Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein & Paul Slovic, Sympathy and Callousness: The
Impact of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROCESSES 143, 150 (2007).
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photographs of adorable children with mangled mouths. The appeal to sympa-
thy is overwhelming, and the “ask” is relatively simple and effective: “It costs as
little as $250 to give a desperate child not just a new smile, but a new life.”34
Framing – and our intuitive responses to different frames – has a huge effect on
how we respond to different human rights issues. Smile Train may be a worthy
cause, but one suspects that its huge success has more to do with the gut
feelings the service evokes in its audience than with a deliberative distribution
of resources aimed at maximizing human rights protection.
These findings about psychic numbing are somewhat confounding. Where
moral outrage causes people to care too much about a particular scenario,
allowing their intuitions to override their deliberative thought processes, here
we find that people sometimes care too little – that is, they are intuitively turned
off by large-scale suffering, and accordingly make suboptimal decisions. Taken
together, these findings suggest that there may in fact be an optimal level of
concern for human rights abuses – enough concern to avoid psychic numbing,
but not so much concern so as to trigger moral outrage.
Naïve Realism
One of the most striking features of the human rights movement has been the
widespread appeal and world-wide adoption of rights rhetoric. Even critics of
the regime acknowledge the political power of rights language. Political scientist
Emilie Hafner-Burton has catalogued the amazing spread of human rights
rhetoric in international relations.35 Even when states do not fulfill their inter-
national commitments to human rights principles, they speak in human rights
terms. Many human rights advocates hope this this will lead to lasting change in
the long-run. But one underappreciated cost of rights language – the language
of deontological rights and wrongs – is that it encourages naïve realist thinking
and therefore inhibits conflict resolution.36
Naïve realists – and we are all naïve realists at one time or another – think
the world is the way they perceive it. Just as importantly, they think of them-
selves as reasonable and rational agents who are capable of persuading other
34 See, e.g. the website of the NGO, Smile Train, www.smiletrain.org.
35 Emilie Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement
Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008).
36 See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and
Misunderstanding, in VALUES and KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel & Terrence
Brown eds., 1996) (describing how naïve realist thinking emboldens rivals and inhibits mean-
ingful negotiation).
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reasonable people to see things their way, and that when this does not happen
the others must be stupid, biased, or irrational.37 The three central components
can best be explained by breaking down the naïve realist thought process, which
goes as follows:
1. I see things as they really are.
2. Other fair-minded people will share my views.
3. If someone doesn’t share my views, and I can’t just explain it to them, that
shows that they are lazy, stupid, or biased (irrational).38
Naïve realism offers the central insight that we misread the nature of other
people’s views – that we underestimate their sincerity. We have a tendency to
say, “Oh, people will say anything,” especially when they are enemies or
competitors, when in fact they may authentically feel a certain way. Liberals
in the United States, for example, tend not to believe that people opposing
health care actually think that nationalized medicine would harm Americans,
but many of them do; likewise, conservatives suspect that when liberals propose
nationalizing health care what they really want is an increase in federal power
generally.39 Both sides doubt the sincerity of the other; both sides look to
explain away the other’s statements by doubting their motivations. Members
of both sides think they are obviously morally right, and the other side is
obviously morally wrong.
Numerous studies confirm this. One experiment by Ross, for example,
showed that both pro-Arab audiences and pro-Israeli audiences watching the
same news coverage of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 thought the
coverage was biased against them. Similar results were found with Dartmouth
and Princeton fans watching the same football game and judging the fairness of
the game. A related and perhaps more troubling study showed that when
Palestinians and Israelis were given proposals for a solution to the contentious
Israeli settlements, both sides preferred the others’ proposals if and only if they
thought it was in fact proposed by their side.40
The lesson from naïve realism scholarship is that we see our own way of
looking at the world – from our obligations to outgroups and enemies (and even
37 See, e.g. LEE ROSS AND RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991, afterword to 2011
edition) (offering a description of naïve realism thinking and calling it more fundamental than
the fundamental attribution error).
38 This first-person schema is taken from Ross & Ward, Naïve Realism.
39 For an excellent demonstration of this, see Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot:
Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002).
40 Susan Hackley, Max Bazerman, Lee Ross & Daniel L. Shapiro, Psychological Dimensions of
the Israeli Settlements Issue: Endowments and Identities, 21 NEGOTIATION J. 209 (2005).
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to animals, the environment, and more) to our interpretation of history and the
entitlements it confers – as reasonable and rational, and we see alternative
views as biased, irrational, reflective of flaws in character, and so on. It is not
just that moralistic language imperils conflict resolution: It also starts and
maintains conflict by emboldening political constituents with no interest in
compromise. This suggests that not only are we hard-wired to make irrational
decisions about moral quandaries – as when we experience moral outrage and
psychic numbing – but we are hard-wired in a way that makes righteous talk
costly.
Human rights advocacy encourages strong intuitive feelings about right and
wrong, but the naïve realism research suggests that there may be costs to
thinking about conflict in such black and white terms. Insofar as rights talk
emboldens naïve realist thinking and inhibits compromise, it may imperil con-
flict resolution, which is a key goal of the human rights regime. Moreover, the
lack of conflict resolution may lead to downstream human rights abuses.
Implications for Human Rights Advocacy
Moral intuitions are fallible, and there are at least three sorts of judgment biases
(and very likely many more) that are especially costly in the context of human
rights advocacy. Human rights advocacy plays a critical role in identifying
human rights abuses, promoting human rights norms, and mobilizing political
forces to protect human rights.41 Perhaps no better example of the powerful role
that human rights advocates can have is the recent Kony 2012 campaign.42 The
video is not a mere newsreel of statistics about the suffering in Uganda –
statistics that Slovic’s research tells us are unlikely to spark an automatic
sympathetic response. Rather, the video tells the story of a white American
traveling in Africa where he met a child who was running from Kony’s forces,
which killed the boy’s brother. The film’s narrator, Jason Russell, promises the
boy that he will help bring Joseph Kony to justice, and the viewer is asked to
help as well.43
41 See Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks, in
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 63 (1998).
42 See Karen DeYoung, Joseph Kony: Barack Obama Sends Planes to Uganda as Hunt for Lord’s
Resistance Army Warlord Intensifies, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 24, 2014, available at http://perma.cc/
5KD8-LN6X.
43 See Kony 2012, supra note 4.
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The results were spectacular. With over 100 million views, the video was
dubbed the most viral video ever,44 the US Senate issued a resolution condemn-
ing Kony’s “crimes against humanity,”45 and the United States sent troops and
aircraft to help the African Union hunt down Kony, who faces indictment at the
International Criminal Court.46 While Kony remains at large, the campaign has
been enormously successful at generating attention and mobilizing political will
in the Western world to focus on human rights abuses in Uganda.
Precisely because it was so successful, the video was celebrated by many
human rights activists who hoped to emulate the video’s success.47 In many
respects, this is not surprising at all. The video is only the latest and most
successful in a long history of human rights advocacy that seeks to use publicity
to “shame and blame” human rights violators. In particular, the video tells a
familiar story featuring three roles: a savage, a victim, and a savior.48 As Makau
Mutua showed long ago, this is a standard narrative for human rights advocacy
stories – one that typically elevates the savior and denigrates the victim.49 The
video’s success – indeed, the success of all shame-and-blame stories – is partly
due to the fact that they identify a clear victim and a clear villain.50
These are powerful attention-getting strategies. They suggest that human
rights advocates have devised a way to overcome the risk of psychic numbing
with stories and affect-laden images. These strategies work precisely because
they counteract our biases against faraway suffering. We are intuitively drawn to
sympathetic victims and simplistic stories of good versus evil, and the Kony 2012
video is an example of advocates seeking to tell a complex story in a way that
makes it intuitively compelling.
But there are significant shortcomings to this approach. Not all human
rights abuses can be made intuitively sympathetic to people, and this raises
44 See Nick Carbone, Kony 2012, Time.Com, Dec. 4, 2012, available at http://entertainment.
time.com/2012/12/04/top-10-arts-lists/slide/kony-2012/.
45 See Press Release, Senate Condemns Crimes of Joseph Kony and Lord’s Resistance Army, Aug.
3, 2012, available at http://www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senate-
condemns-crimes-of-joseph-kony-and-lords-resistance-army.
46 See Helene Cooper, More U.S. Troops to Aid Uganda Search for Kony, N.Y. TIMES A7, Mar. 23,
2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/world/africa/obama-is-sending-more-
resources-for-joseph-kony-search.html.
47 Michael Hoffman, Why “Kony 2012” Video Grabbed 100 Million Views Online, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 15, 2012, available at http://perma.cc/VRP6-A8LG.
48 See Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV.
INT’L. L. J. 1 201 (2001).
49 Id.
50 See Hoffman, supra note 47 (“In the video, Mr. Kony is portrayed as evil – as if he is a villain in
a Batman movie. And if he is the evil villain, then you, the person fighting him, are the hero.”).
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the prospect of suboptimal resource allocation. In other words, policy decisions
are made and resources allocated based solely on a particular issue’s photogenic
qualities – that is, the extent to which it lends itself to stories that provoke the
moral intuitions of a public, moral intuitions that we know can bias our decision
making. While the makers of the Kony 2012 video constructed a compelling
narrative to tell the story of the atrocities committed by the Lord’s Resistance
Army, not all human rights abuses lend themselves to such compelling narra-
tives. In fact, one of the most damning critiques of the Kony 2012 campaign was
that in order to tell such a compelling narrative, the filmmakers told an incom-
plete story, and in several cases got the facts wrong.51 This is obviously proble-
matic. Insofar as the story is factually incorrect, it might mobilize people to take
policy steps that are suboptimal.
This is one hypothesis about the harms of relying on moral intuitions to
drive advocacy: that it leads to suboptimal resource allocation. We can generate
a number of other hypotheses as well. For example, it would be reasonable to
think that such human rights advocacy campaigns that appeal to moral intui-
tions will tend to favor civil and political rights over economic and social rights.
While a video can be made to tell the story of a boy who lost his brother and the
effort to arrest the bad man who did it, it is much harder to tell an intuitively
compelling video about, for example, the social and economic situation that
enabled this killing to take place.52 Civil rights more readily feature identifiable
victims, and identifiable victims are necessary to launch successful (intuitively
compelling) advocacy campaigns. It is precisely for this reason that Kenneth
Roth, the head of Human Rights Watch, has said that human rights groups
should focus on civil and political rights issues rather than economic and social
rights issues: because the former lend themselves to the sort of shaming and
blaming that works, the kind that appeals to moral intuitions about right and
wrong, good and bad.53
We might also predict that human rights advocacy will be shallow rather
than deep. That is, advocacy that appeals to moral intuitions is likely to focus on
individual human rights violations – which are typically symptoms of larger
human rights issues. For example, rather than tell the story of Uganda’s shaky
political leadership post-colonization, or the history of natural resource conflict
in the country, or the story of Sudan’s interest in Uganda’s destabilization, the
51 See Ethan Zuckerman, Unpacking Kony 2012, Mar. 8, 2012, available at http://www.ethan-
zuckerman.com/blog/2012/03/08/unpacking-kony-2012/.
52 This is perhaps especially true for Western audiences.
53 See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by
an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 67 (2004).
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Kony 2012 video tells the story of a bad man and a sad boy. It is a massively
successful, intuitively appealing, but ultimately shallow campaign. Indeed, the
campaign repeated one of the most common wrongheaded narratives of the
Ugandan armed conflict, the story of a bad-man rebel, hungry for natural
resources and power, a narrative that leaves out many of the complexities of
Uganda’s internal power struggles.54
Advocacy also appears to have an ex post bias. That is, in order to be
intuitively compelling, advocacy will tend to be backward looking rather than
forward looking. Advocacy that seeks to stoke the moral intuitions will point to
hard realities – documented instances of rights abuses with clear identifiable
victims and perpetrators – rather than vague or distant possibilities. You can get
compelling footage of events passed, while you cannot film the future. As a
result, it will be concerned with righting the wrongs of the past – with restora-
tive justice – rather than preventing those harms from occurring again.
Finally, advocacy is likely to stoke moral outrage, priming people to be
overly punitive and insufficiently willing to compromise, even where compro-
mise means fewer human rights abuses.55 Recall the Baron and Ritov studies,
showing that otherwise consequentialists become deep retributivists when they
are outraged.56 Similarly, we might imagine that human rights advocacy that
encourages moral outrage will lead people to seek retributive justice for human
rights violators rather than a negotiated political compromise. For evidence that
this is in fact what happens, consider the fact that when Kony met with
negotiators in 2006, he was dissuaded from disarming because of his indictment
at the International Criminal Court (ICC), an indictment advocates around the
world insisted not be lifted in the name of peace.57
These are all sensible – and testable – hypotheses that merit further study.
Our moral intuitions are subject to a number of biases, like the bias for cute
faces over statistics, and human rights advocacy seeks to exploit these biases for
obvious reasons. This can be good: advocates can use this bias to get audiences
to care about faraway harms that they might not otherwise care about. But this
advocacy can only overcome certain kinds of biases, and it may in fact introduce
new biases – such as the bias for civil rights over economic rights, the bias
54 See Séverine Autesserre, Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their
Unintended Consequences, 111 AFR. AFF. 202 (Spring 2012).
55 In many respects, this is the case for the current international criminal regime, which largely
prefers punishment to political compromise, and which exhibits a strong retributive impulse.
See Woods, supra note 8.
56 See Baron & Ritov, supra note 23.
57 See Norbert Mao, Guest Post: I’ve Met Joseph Kony and Kony 2012 Isn’t That Bad, Mar. 21,
2012, available at http://perma.cc/LET9-Q6NN.
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toward punishment and away from settlement, and so on. Not only will future
research need to test the foregoing hypotheses, it will need to weigh the costs
from these biases – the costs of advocacy that plays to moral intuitions – against
the benefits of such advocacy. Without this analysis, we cannot say whether
advocacy that appeals to the moral intuitions is a net boon or a net harm to the
human rights regime. In the meantime, however, we can attempt to develop
strategies for minimizing the likely harms of such advocacy while preserving, if
possible, the benefits of appealing to moral intuitions.
Managing Our Moral Intuitions
What should we do with the news that our moral intuitions are imperfect guides
for human rights policy? We might imagine two sorts of normative responses.
The first response rejects our intuitions. It says that because the moral intuitions
can mislead us, they should be distrusted and discouraged at every turn. Call
this the anti-intuition position. The anti-intuition position is theoretically attrac-
tive because it promises outcomes free from judgment biases. Ideally, with the
right information and the right decision-making process, human rights policy-
makers can allocate resources efficiently and avoid the suboptimal policymak-
ing produced by psychic numbing, moral outrage, and more. Our guts are more
feeble than our minds; this claim goes, so we ought to install deliberative
procedures and institutions to ensure that intuitions never get in the way of
good human rights policy. This approach would likely require abandoning a
rights framework, wherever rights talk produced more harm than good, and
would instead call for maximizing human welfare.
The problems with this approach are too many to list. Even if better deci-
sions were theoretically possible by taking intuition out of human rights dis-
course, it would be entirely unrealistic to do so. Human rights advocates and
norm entrepreneurs are unlikely to be willing to give up one of their most
powerful weapons for social and political mobilization. Moreover, intuitions
are complex things; it is implausible that any effort to develop policy without
evoking moral intuitions – on matters related to human rights, no less – would
succeed. It seems politically impractical, too, to create a system that denies
deeply ingrained human intuitions about grave moral questions; in a democracy
at least, this approach seems unlikely to last very long. Finally, rights are often
described as one-way ratchets. It seems implausible, even if it were desirable, to
leave the existing human rights framework behind in favor of some alternative
regime aimed at maximizing human welfare.
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A second approach is perhaps a bit more realistic. It suggests that moral
intuitions are powerful and useful – but they should be deployed in limited
contexts and with built-in safeguards. Call this the compatibilist position. This
hybrid approach would use deliberative over-rides wherever we anticipate that
intuitions are likely to produce suboptimal policy. For example, the psychic
numbing literature suggests that there is a great risk that international monitors
and the citizens of states required to authorize an intervention will fail to
recognize the cost of great losses of life as the number of losses increases.58 A
shift in default rules might be designed specifically to counteract this problem.
Elsewhere my co-authors and I described how one such lock-step proposal
might work to prevent the harms of psychic numbing which could inhibit
political action in response to an escalating conflict risking genocide:
Say, for example, that valuations of life begin to drop off significantly after 10 deaths. At 10
deaths, a pre-authorized U.N. investigation would automatically be triggered (implement-
ing new reporting methods, as discussed below); at 100 deaths, that investigatory body
would immediately acquire certain authorities. These lock-step provisions can be justified
on the grounds that any more subjective metric raises the risk of psychic numbing. If such
a system could be implemented, it could limit the opportunity for genocidaire-states to
stall international intervention under the guise of diplomatic debate.59
Triggers have their own risks, of course. They discourage creative thinking and
flexible problem solving by quantifying and systematizing complex human
political phenomena. Treating the task of monitoring the risk of genocide as a
checklist of a series of warning signs may increase the overall comprehensive-
ness of the monitoring effort, but it also may increase the risk that monitors will
miss important events that fall outside the scope of their checklist. In this way,
the checklist also risks complacency. But if the checklist is well designed, the
risks imposed by this complacency are unlikely to be greater than the risk that
without the triggers the regime will be either unresponsive or insufficiently
responsive to mass atrocity.60 Additionally, just because triggers are deemed a
useful mechanism for authorizing intervention does not mean that such
58 Psychic numbing is the name given to the phenomenon whereby people value lives less as
the numbers of lives at risk goes up. See David Fetherstonhaugh, Paul Slovic, Stephen Johnson
& James Friedrich, Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing,
14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 283 (1997).
59 See Goodman et al., supra note 32, at 135.
60 Consider, as an example, the checklists used to increase the safety of airplane travel
worldwide. A number of recurring human errors were causing a significant number of crashes.
Today, the number of crashes is reduced significantly because of the implementation of routine,
checklist procedures. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS (2008).
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intervention will be called for in every case. The trigger would merely resolve the
question of authority to intervene, without solving the questions of who and how
and when to intervene.
This compatibilist approach is not without its problems. Critics will say it
does not go far enough and may even be self-defeating. In the psychic numbing
scenario, for example, activists use emotion to overcome heuristic failure. But
they adopt a strategy that emphasizes relying on moral intuitions, thereby
risking other heuristic failures. One way to address this concern is to draw a
distinction between relying on moral intuitions in developing human rights
policy – setting funding priorities, choosing who to punish and why, etc. –
and relying on intuitions in the execution of a particular human rights policy.
This is not a perfect distinction, of course, because emphasizing intuitions in the
execution of human rights policy might lead to a wider discourse that embraces
moral intuitions which could have upstream effects on the development of
human rights policy. But the distinction might be useful at a high level of
generality.
We can draw a further distinction between different sorts of institutions and
actors in the human rights regime. For example, it might be entirely unaccep-
table for judges to let their intuitions guide sentencing practices in human rights
cases – and we might seek to limit the expression of moral intuitions like
indignation in human rights trials – but moral intuitions could still be useful
in some limited forms of public education and outreach (if not full throated
advocacy). Here, too, there is a risk of spillover from one institutional setting to
the next. For example, if a judge makes a decision with the aid of careful
deliberation and safeguards to limit the risks of moral outrage, but the decision
is promoted by human rights advocates as proof of the intuition that the
defendant violated moral norms, it can prime the audience to expect policy
that matches their moral intuitions.
Conclusion
Where does this leave us? At one extreme, we can reject any proposal that asks
us to embrace moral intuitions as perfect guides to solve complex moral ques-
tions; and it should be unpersuasive in debates over human rights policy to say
that one policy is “intuitively better” than another. At the other extreme, we can
reject as impracticable any proposal that requires total suppression of moral
intuitions. That leaves us somewhere in the middle. A better approach will allow
advocates to make use of the moral emotions, while also taking steps to ensure
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deliberative overrides and safeguards exist to correct for heuristic failure where
that failure would produce bad human rights policy. Rather than call for “sym-
pathetic education,” – Rorty’s term for getting people to feel sympathy for the
suffering of others – policymakers might aim for “moral intuition education,”
which would have two aims. First, this sort of education would encourage
people to develop strong moral intuitions that align with optimal human rights
policy. For example, this might mean dialing down the retributive impulse and
strengthening our intuitions about social and economic welfare. Second, this
sort of education would ensure that voters, consumers, and policymakers are
aware of the limits of their intuitions. Rather than blindly asking people to
follow their intuitions, we might hope that human rights policymakers will ask
people to evaluate and check their intuitions against their better and more
carefully considered judgment.
Acknowledgments: The author thanks the conference participants for valuable
feedback on the essay, especially Ram Rivlin for his thoughtful comments.
Note: This essay was presented at the “Human Rights and the Human Minds” conference at the
College of Law and Business in Ramat Gan, Israel. The summary of the mind sciences literature on
moral decision is adapted from my earlier piece, Moral Judgments and International Crimes: The
Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633 (2012). All errors are mine.
The Limits of Moral Intuitions for Human Rights Advocacy 111
Authenticated | andrewkwoods@uky.edu author's copy
Download Date | 6/18/15 11:19 PM
